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Energy endowments and the location of manufacturing firms 
 
Abstract 
This paper provides empirical evidence on whether individual firms choose to structure their 
production globally to exploit international differences in energy resources and prices. We use the 
US shale gas revolution as a quasi-natural experiment to analyse two extensive margins of 
adjustment by heterogeneous UK firms. First, we consider whether energy intensive UK firms 
have established new affiliates in the US in response to the shale gas shock. Second, we explore 
within-firm plant-level adjustments to consider whether the energy price gap increases the 
propensity for firms that have US operations to shut down their energy intensive UK plants. We 
find evidence in support of these two margins of adjustment. Taken together, these results suggest 
that multinational firms have relocated energy intensive production from the UK to the US due 
to the endowment-driven energy price gap. 
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1. Introduction 
Over recent years, trends in energy prices and energy independence have diverged across 
developed countries. In the US, the development of hydraulic fracturing (fracking) techniques has 
led to a considerable increase in the supply, and corresponding fall in the price, of natural gas and 
petroleum liquids. This contrasts with an increased reliance on energy imports in many other 
OECD countries, most notably in Europe. To take one example, the UK’s endowment of natural 
gas and oil has been in steady decline as the North Sea oil and gas fields have matured. Imported 
fuels are relatively expensive due to the economic costs of transportation, especially in the case of 
natural gas. Therefore, industrial natural gas prices are now around 2.6 times higher in the UK 
than the US (on average for 2012-2015). Figure 1 illustrates the close relationship between the 
natural gas endowment gap and the absolute price gap for the UK-US, while Figure 2 shows the 
contrasting trends in dependency on energy imports for the two countries.1   
Figure 1: UK-US natural gas endowment gap and price gap  
 
Notes: On the left axis the figure shows the UK-US absolute natural gas price gap, calculated using industrial gas 
price data from the IEA. On the right axis the figure shows the US-UK natural gas endowment ratio. UK energy 
endowment data are from the Office for National Statistics environmental accounts. US energy endowment data are 
from the US Energy Information Administration.  
                                                     
1 At the time of writing there has been no commercial shale gas drilling in the UK, despite the UK government 
being supportive of shale gas development. The lack of fracking in the UK has been attributed to various factors, 
including that the most of suitable fracking sites are located under densely populated cities, and that rights to oil and 
gas deposits belong to the British crown and not landowners (unlike in the US) (Economist, 2015). 
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Figure 2: UK and US dependency on energy imports  
 
Notes: Figure shows percentage of total energy supply from net energy imports in UK and US. Authors’ calculations 
using data from Eurostat and the US Energy Information Administration.  
A number of business leaders and analysts have expressed concerns about the effect of the energy 
price gap with the US on the international competitiveness of European firms, raising the 
possibility that they will either shut down, or move to the US in order to take advantage of lower 
energy costs. For example, the International Energy Agency suggests that the energy price gap 
with the US will hurt Europe’s competitiveness for “at least 20 years”.2 Likewise, according to the 
Chief Executive of Eon, Johannes Teyssen: “There is no near-term cure for Europe’s energy price 
gap with the US...Companies will continue to move overseas as a result.” “The price difference is 
unnerving some companies and deciding their investments.”3 Predictions of this type follow 
directly from theories of vertical foreign direct investment (FDI), where international differences 
in factor endowments influence the pattern of investment and firms locate different stages of the 
production process according to where the factors used intensively in production are relatively 
cheap.  
In this paper, we investigate whether firms behave in this way using the US energy revolution as a 
quasi-natural experiment, and rich micro data on the FDI decisions and energy consumption of 
individual UK manufacturing firms. Our results suggest that UK firms have adjusted to the US 
energy endowment shock at two extensive margins. First, we find that energy intensive UK firms 
have established new affiliates in the US in response to the endowment-driven energy price gap. 
                                                     
2 Inset from article in Financial Times on January 29th 2014. See https://www.ft.com. 
3 Insert from articles in Financial Times on September 29th 2013 and October 13th 2013. See https://www.ft.com.    
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We find that this effect is strongest for firms with the most energy intensive manufacturing units. 
When measuring energy intensity as an average across all UK manufacturing units owned by a 
firm, there is a much weaker effect on the firm’s decision to invest in the US. These results suggest 
that it is important to take within-firm differences in energy intensity into account when modelling 
firm-level FDI decisions in the presence of energy endowment shocks. We find the results are 
robust to various concerns about omitted variables, measurement issues and pre-existing trends. 
In a falsification test, we also show that the US energy endowment shock does not explain UK 
outward FDI into other European countries. These findings support the interpretation of our 
results as the causal effect of the US energy endowment shock on UK FDI into the US. 
Second, we find evidence that the endowment-driven energy price gap between the UK and US 
has led to the increased closure of energy intensive UK plants. Relative to a control group of 
multinational firms that are not investing in the US, we find that US investors are more likely to 
shut their energy intensive UK plants after the energy price gap emerges. This result holds when 
we control for unobserved firm heterogeneity and is robust to alternative measures of the energy 
price gap. These findings provide justification for the fear that the growth of US fracking has led 
to the relocation of energy intensive production from the UK to the US. More generally, the results 
provide new evidence on the relationship between input costs and the location of manufacturing 
plants. 
This paper contributes to various strands of the existing literature. First, we add to work that 
investigates whether energy prices are a source of comparative advantage and therefore affect 
international trade and investment. This literature focuses mostly on industry level trade responses, 
rather than firm level investment decisions. Arezki et al. (2017) investigate the impact of the US 
shale gas revolution on the production and trade patterns of US manufacturing industries. They 
estimate that lower relative natural gas prices led US exports to increase by more than $100 billion 
for energy intensive manufacturing in 2012. Other studies that investigate the effect of energy 
prices on exports at the industry level include Aldy and Pizer (2015) and Sato and Dechezlepretre 
(2015). One study on FDI effects is Saussay and Sato (2018). They consider the impact of energy 
prices on (2-digit) industry level mergers and acquisitions for a panel of 41 countries. We are the 
first study in this literature to investigate the micro level investment decisions of individual firms 
that are heterogeneous in their use of energy. This approach is important to understand the 
mechanisms underlying the industry level responses previously identified. Only a few studies have 
previously considered the relationship between energy prices and firm-level investment decisions, 
including Ratti et al. (2011) and Panhans et al. (2017). Due to a lack of disaggregated data on the 
energy intensity of individual firms or a quasi-experimental setting, these studies base identification 
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of such effects on national variation in energy prices across many countries. Such an approach 
makes it impossible to rule out other country-time specific confounders as drivers of this 
correlation.4  
Second, we add to the more general literature on the determinants of outward FDI. There are 
several studies that analyse the comparative advantage motive for FDI – namely, that international 
differences in factor endowments influence the pattern of investment according to the factor 
intensity of production (e.g. Eaton and Tamura (1994), Yeaple (2003) and Alfaro and Charlton 
(2009)). We add to this literature by adopting a novel test of the comparative advantage motive: 
we exploit a quasi-natural experiment in the form of a shock to a single country’s (the US) 
endowment of an input to production (energy). We then use this to study the effect on the outward 
FDI behaviour of firms that are heterogeneous in their intensity of use in this factor of production. 
To the best our knowledge this has not been done before.  
Third, we contribute to the literature on the effect of outward investment on the home-country 
operations of multinational firms. This literature largely focuses on the role of international wage 
differentials (Braconier and Ekholm, 2000; Head and Ries, 2002; Muendler and Becker, 2010; 
Harrison and McMillan, 2011; Simpson, 2012), motivated by concerns that multinationals offshore 
low-wage, labour intensive production to economies with lower labour costs. Developing 
countries are less likely to be attractive destinations for FDI in capital intensive industries, as they 
are typically capital scarce. Thus, we add to the literature by examining FDI between developed 
countries with similar capital-abundancy and labour markets, but with very different relative prices 
for a different input to production (energy). Energy prices may be an important consideration for 
the location of capital-intensive firms – which are also usually energy intensive – and thus may 
provide an alternative motive for offshoring production than international differences in wages. 
To the best of our knowledge, no previous studies on the effects of outward FDI on the home-
country operations of firms have considered this motive. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we set out the econometric approach. 
Section 3 describes our dataset and presents summary statistics. Section 4 gives the results of the 
analysis. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Empirical Methodology 
                                                     
4 A related literature considers the impact of energy prices on domestic competitiveness by examining the location 
decision of energy intensive production within the US. This literature includes Michielsen (2011) and Kahn and 
Mansur (2013). We extend these studies to the international context by looking at relocation between the UK and 
US.  
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In this section we present the empirical specifications we estimate to explore the effect of the US 
energy endowment shock on the location decisions of UK manufacturing firms. 
2.1 Firm investment in US 
For the first stage of our analysis, we empirically model the decision by UK manufacturing firms 
to invest in the US; that is, operate a US affiliate or branch. We use this framework to consider 
whether energy intensive UK firms have established new affiliates in the US due to the shale gas 
shock. We adopt a differences-in-differences approach that compares the propensity to invest in 
the US before and after the UK-US energy price gap emerges, and for energy intensive versus non-
energy intensive firms.5  
The energy intensity of a firm’s operations at home in the UK may of course be affected by its 
decision to invest in the US. To remove such effects, we fix the firm’s energy intensity equal to its 
energy intensity at the beginning of the sample period. We also check the robustness of our results 
to different definitions of firm energy intensity (see section 3). To remove the confounding 
influence of time-invariant observed and unobserved firm heterogeneity that may affect the 
likelihood that the firm invests in the US, we focus on a model with firm fixed effects.  
Our empirical strategy also addresses the critique of differences-in-differences put forward by 
Bertrand et al. (2004); namely, that when using many years of data, standard errors will likely be 
inconsistent due to serially correlated outcomes. Furthermore, they find that econometric 
corrections that place a parametric form on the time-series process do not perform well. This 
problem is especially relevant in the context of our analysis, because the substantial sunk costs 
involved with establishing a new foreign affiliate or branch (such as contract negotiations and 
market research) mean that it is unlikely that firms respond quickly to price changes, such as energy 
price shocks. Thus, the decision to operate a plant in the US is highly persistent and varies little on 
an annual basis.  
We adopt two estimation methods to deal with these issues. In the first estimation approach, we 
model the cumulative effect of all decisions to establish new foreign affiliates in the US in the post-
fracking period. We do this by collapsing the time series information down to two observations 
for each firm, which capture the propensity to invest in the US before and after the fracking shock 
                                                     
5 In our analysis we do not exploit spatial variation in energy prices within the US. This is because the US shale gas 
revolution has had nationwide impacts, and our FDI data do not provide information on within-country location 
decisions. Nonetheless, energy prices, especially electricity prices, do vary within the US. The location within the US 
of affiliates established by energy intensive UK firms may to some extent be influenced by these differences. For 
evidence on the regional specialisation in energy intensive industries within the US, see Michielsen (2011) and Kahn 
and Mansur (2013). 
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to the energy price gap. As shown in Figure 1 above, the natural gas price gap started to emerge in 
2006 when US natural gas prices first became lower than UK prices. Given that the price gap is 
plausibly unanticipated, we use 2006 as our baseline year. We then estimate a long interval that 
compares the propensity to operate US affiliates in 2006 to 2015. We choose 2015 as the post-
energy shock year as it is the most recent year for which we have FDI data, giving firms the longest 
possible time to respond to the energy price gap.  
Bertrand et al. (2004) find that collapsing data to a pre and post period performs well as a solution 
to the serial correlation problem. In addition, the long interval approach is appealing because it 
allows us to focus on the long-run effect of the US energy revolution, rather than identifying year-
to-year adjustments in FDI using annual data. This is consistent with our expectation that 
comparative advantage does not to vary substantially from one year to the next. 
We estimate the following regression equation using data at the firm level for the long interval 
between 2006 and 2015: 
𝑈𝑆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑘𝑡
𝑗 = 𝑎𝑘 + 𝜋1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 × 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑘 + 𝑑𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑘𝑡     (1) 
where 𝑈𝑆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if UK firm k in sector j has a foreign 
affiliate in the US in time period t and 0 if it does not. 𝑎𝑘 is a firm fixed effect,  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 for the post-energy shock year (2015) and 0 for the baseline year (2006). 𝑑𝑗,𝑡 
is a vector of time-varying 2-digit sector effects that capture unobserved sector-specific trends 
(such as regulatory changes or demand shocks). 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑘 is a continuous variable that 
measures the pre-determined energy intensity of the firm in the UK. As 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑘 is time-
invariant, the direct effect of this term is captured by the firm fixed effect and is therefore not 
included in (1). Likewise, the 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 variable does not enter in (1) directly because it is captured by 
the sector-time dummies. Finally, 𝜀𝑘𝑡 is a robust error term. More details on the definitions of the 
variables are provided in section 3. 
Equation (1) is a standard difference-in-differences model, although it exploits a treatment 
intensity in the form of the energy intensity of the firm. The key parameter of interest is 𝜋1 on the 
interaction term between 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 and 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑘. This interaction term captures the 
heterogeneous impact of the reduction in relative energy prices in the US on the incentive to invest 
in the US across different UK manufacturing firms according to their energy intensity of 
production. A positive and significant coefficient would suggest that energy intensive UK firms 
are significantly more likely to invest in the US in the post-energy shock time period. The inclusion 
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of time-varying sector dummies means that identification comes from within-sector variation in 
the energy intensity of firms. 
For our long interval approach, we use only two periods of data and so we estimate equation (1) 
in first differences. First differencing eliminates the firm fixed effect 𝑎𝑘. Therefore equation (1) 
becomes: 
∆𝑈𝑆𝐹𝐷𝐼k = 𝜋1𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑘 + 𝑑𝑗 + ∆𝜀𝑘   (1a) 
Where we estimate (1a) using OLS. As before, a positive and significant coefficient on 𝜋1 suggests 
firms are entering US investment to take advantage of the US energy endowment and price shock. 
We also estimate alternative specifications that allow us to consider the robustness of our results 
to the probit estimator (see section 4). 
The underlying assumption when estimating (1a) is that in the absence of the endowment-driven 
shock to relative energy prices, the propensity for UK energy intensive firms to invest in the US 
should be the same over time, relative to non-energy intensive firms, conditional on the firm fixed 
effects. If the common trends assumption is violated, our analysis will not capture a causal 
relationship. While controlling for sector specific trends, such that identification comes from 
within-sector variation in firm energy intensity, may mitigate any spurious effects, we adopt a 
number of approaches to address these concerns.   
First, we consider a falsification test – we look at whether the US energy shock affected UK 
outward FDI into countries that had no energy endowment shock. As energy prices in the EU 
have moved closely with energy prices in the UK, we use the OECD EU countries for this 
falsification test. In the absence of spurious confounders, we should of course expect to find no 
statistically significant and positive effect of the interaction term between 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 and 
𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑘. If instead there is a positive and significant effect for the EU investment 
decision, it suggests the results for the US are not driven by the US endowment-driven price gap, 
but alternatively reflect a trend towards more outward FDI by energy intensive UK firms into all 
OECD countries. This might be driven by some other motivation that varies over time and is 
correlated with firm energy intensity. As a second approach, we test the common trends 
assumption by performing a test which looks for an effect of the interaction term of interest in the 
same long-difference model (1a) estimated for the pre-sample period. The absence of a significant 
pre-existing trend, particularly a positive trend, would support the interpretation of our results for 
the US FDI decision as the casual effect of the UK-US energy price gap.   
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Notwithstanding the persistence of the FDI decision, a natural concern is whether the results are 
robust to alternative choices for the comparison years before and after the US energy price shock. 
Measurement error in the FDI variable or transitory shocks may mean that these years are not 
representative of FDI decisions before and after the price adjustment. Furthermore, if the 
assumption of no anticipatory effects is invalid, energy intensive firms may have already switched 
into US investment by 2006 due to the energy price gap.  
Our second estimation approach aims to address these concerns by using annual data to flexibly 
reveal the dynamics of the evolution of the US FDI decision and its correlation with the firm’s 
energy intensity. This empirical exercise allows us to consider when UK energy intensive firms are 
switching into US investment, and to examine whether 2006 and 2015 are representative of FDI 
positions before and after the energy price shock. The empirical specification takes the following 
form:  
𝑈𝑆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑘𝑡
𝑗 = 𝑎𝑘 + ∑ 𝛿𝑡𝑡 × 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑘 + 𝑑𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑘𝑡      (2) 
Where 𝛿𝑡 is a vector of coefficients for each year in our sample. Other variables are defined as 
above. Equation (2) is a firm fixed effects model estimated in levels for the period 2002-2015. We 
present the results by plotting the estimates 𝛿𝑡 graphically and we compare to the coefficients from 
the estimation of the same specification for the EU FDI decision.  
2.2 Plant exit in UK  
For the second stage of our analysis, we consider whether there is evidence that firms investing in 
the US are shutting down their energy intensive production in the UK in response to the 
endowment-driven energy price gap. Multinational firms typically operate multiple plants in the 
UK that vary in their energy intensity of production. Therefore, for the exit analysis we exploit 
within-firm, plant level data. We use annual data for the period 2002-2015, which allows us to 
compare the propensity to exit both before and after the UK-US energy price gap emerges. To 
measure the energy intensity of the plant we use energy intensity for the 5-digit industry in which 
the plant operates (see section 3.2). 
To analyse the closure of energy intensive UK plants, we estimate a hazard model of plant survival. 
Hazard models use information on the duration of plant survival and so take into account that 
conditional survival rates may vary over the plant survival spell. In addition, they naturally account 
9 
 
for the right-censoring of observations (the fact that information on plant survival spells is 
incomplete because some plants remain in operation by the end of our sample period).6 
In our data, entry and exit is only observed in discrete one-year intervals, such that it is not possible 
to order plant survival times within years. As a result, there are a significant number of tied survival 
times, which can lead to biased coefficients and standard errors in continuous-time hazard models, 
such as the popular Cox proportional hazard model (Cox and Oakes, 1984). To address the 
problem of tied failure times, we utilise the discrete time analogue of the Cox proportional hazard 
model. In this case the discrete time hazard rate h of the plant survival spell ending (plant exit) in 
m years, conditional on survival for m-1 years, follows a complementary log-log (cloglog) 
distribution: 
ℎ(𝑚, 𝑋) = 1 − exp [− exp(𝑋𝛽 + 𝛾𝑚)]        (3) 
Where 𝑋 is a vector of time-varying plant characteristics that are related to the hazard rate and 𝛾𝑚 
is the baseline hazard. We model the baseline hazard non-parametrically by including duration-
interval-specific fixed effects that allow for unrestricted changes in the hazard rate over time.  
Our identification strategy involves comparing the propensity to close plants according to their 
energy intensity, across firms that invest in the US and a control group of firms that do not, and 
over time as the UK-US energy price gap emerges, conditional on observable plant characteristics. 
We make this comparison by including the following vector of covariates in (3): 
𝑋𝛽 = 𝑍𝑝𝑡𝛽 + 𝜋0𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑡 + 𝜋1𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝜋2𝑈𝑆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑘𝑡 + 𝜋3𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑡 ∗
𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝜋4𝑈𝑆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑘𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝜋5𝑈𝑆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑘𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑡 + 𝜋6𝑈𝑆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑘𝑡 ∗
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗       (4) 
where p represents the plant, t is the time period, j is the industry in which the plant operates, and 
k is the firm. 𝑍𝑝𝑡 is a vector of plant characteristics that are related to the propensity for plants to 
exit. 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 is a time-invariant and continuous measure of the energy intensity of 
industry j in which the plant operates. As in the first stage of our analysis, we use the (time-
invariant) energy intensity that prevails at the beginning of the sample period to guard against 
potential endogeneity bias. 𝑈𝑆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑘𝑡 is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm invests in the US and 0 
for a control group of firms that do not invest in the US. Firms that invest in the US may 
simultaneously be conducting outward FDI in other countries. Finally, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑡 is the annual 
gap in energy prices between the UK and US.  
                                                     
6 See Manjon-Antolin and Arauzo-Carod (2008) for a survey of the use of hazard models in the firm survival 
literature.  
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The main coefficient of interest in equation (4) is 𝜋6 on the interaction between the 𝑈𝑆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑘𝑡 
indicator, the 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑡 continuous variable and the 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 continuous variable. The 
estimated coefficient on this interaction term captures evidence that firms investing in the US are 
more likely to shut down their energy intensive UK plants than non-US investors in response to 
an increase in the energy price gap. The analysis is akin to a triple difference specification. Thus, if 
𝜋6 in equation (4) is statistically significant and positive, it will be consistent with the hypothesis 
that energy intensive UK plants owned by US investors face a greater hazard rate of exit due to 
the energy price gap.   
We compare firms investing in the US with a control group that consists of multinational firms 
that are engaged in outward FDI, but not in the US. The assumption made here is that, in the 
absence of the US energy endowment shock, plant exit by multinational firms investing in the US 
would have evolved in a similar way over time to plant exit by firms conducting non-US outward 
FDI. Non-US investors should provide a closer comparison group than a larger control group of 
firms that also includes, say, purely domestic firms. Even with a comparison group of similar firms, 
however, the decision to invest in the US may be related to unobserved characteristics that also 
affect the propensity to exit, resulting in an endogeneity bias. To mitigate this concern, we also 
estimate a linear exit probability model with firm fixed effects. This approach allows us to exploit 
the time dimension of the data to control for time-invariant unobservable firm-level characteristics 
that may be correlated with decision to invest in the US. 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 Overseas investment 
We use data on overseas investment by UK-based firms from the Annual Inquiry into Foreign 
Direct Investment (AFDI), collected by the Office for National Statistics. The AFDI register 
provides annual information on the full population of firms conducting outward FDI from the 
UK, and the geographic location of their foreign affiliates or branches. Here, foreign affiliates 
include subsidiaries and associates.7 For the first stage of our analysis, we use these data to 
construct an indicator for UK firms that invest in the US (EU), defined as firms that own at least 
one affiliate or branch in the US (EU) each year. The ownership of an affiliate or branch captures 
                                                     
7 A subsidiary is an overseas company where the investor holds over 50% of the voting power and so can exercise a 
dominant influence. An associate is an overseas company where the parent holds between 10% and 50% of the 
voting power. Both subsidiaries and associates are defined as affiliates. In contrast to an affiliate, a foreign branch is 
a permanent establishment that is not a separate legal entity.   
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a fixed capital investment.8 We also use the AFDI register to derive the counter-factual group in 
the second stage of our analysis, i.e. firms that invest abroad but not in the US. When deriving this 
group, we follow Simpson (2012) and exclude overseas affiliates or branches in countries that are 
designated as tax havens. 
Although the AFDI register includes outward investments by both domestic and foreign owned 
UK firms, when estimating equations (1) and (3) above we focus on the sub-sample of firms that 
are UK owned. Foreign owned firms may behave quite differently to domestically owned firms in 
terms of their outward investment decisions, for various reasons. Most importantly, foreign owned 
UK firms are already multinational, even if the UK firm does not itself engage in outward FDI. In 
addition, we are unable to observe the full set of outward FDI destinations for the foreign parents 
of such firms – for example, in which other countries French firms have overseas affiliates.  
3.2 Firm and plant characteristics 
The second data source used in this analysis is the Annual Respondents Database (ARD), which 
is the largest and most comprehensive source of UK business micro-data collected by the Office 
for National Statistics. The ARD data can be linked to the AFDI register at the firm level using 
unique firm identifiers found in both datasets.9 We use data from the ARD annual production 
survey, which provides detailed information on inputs and output for a sample of UK reporting 
units.10 The survey covers approximately 10,000 reporting units in the manufacturing sector every 
year, including a census of all reporting units with 250 employees or more, and a random sample 
of smaller reporting units.11 From the ARD production survey, we use information on reporting 
unit energy expenditures in the manufacturing sector to measure energy intensity. We follow 
previous studies (Martin et al. 2012; Martin et al. 2014) by considering two definitions of energy 
intensity: (i) energy expenditure as a share of gross output; and (ii) energy expenditure as a share 
of variable costs (including materials, energy and wages).  
A concern regarding the measure of energy expenditure as a share of gross output is that it will be 
affected by differences in the price-cost mark-up across firms, given that output is measured in 
                                                     
8 The AFDI register does not provide any information on affiliate size. However, the AFDI register provides the 
sampling frame for the AFDI survey, that collects annual financial data on overseas activities for a sample of UK 
multinational firms. We do not use the data on financial transactions as we are concerned that financial and 
accounting variables may not reflect actual capital investments. 
9 Criscuolo and Martin (2009), Simpson (2012) and Harris and Moffat (2016), among others, also use these linked 
data. 
10 Firms often own multiple reporting units. In turn, a reporting unit can report on behalf of one or more local units 
(plants) in the same line of business.  
11 The random sampling of smaller reporting units includes a 50% or 100% sample of reporting units with between 
100 and 249 employees, where the fraction varies by industry, a 50% sample of reporting units with 10 to 99 
employees, and a 25% sample of reporting units with fewer than 10 employees. 
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value units. Therefore, energy expenditure as a share of costs may be preferred, although there 
may be a related problem with input price variations across firms that also affect this measure. If 
energy expenditure as a share of costs is correlated with heterogeneous input prices, our analysis 
may in part capture something else that changed in the US economy over time that affects the 
decision to invest through the input price channel. Unfortunately, our dataset does not contain 
information on the prices firms charge for their output or pay for their inputs, so we cannot rule 
out these alternative explanations. However, we do have information on the quantity of labour, 
and so we calculate the average wage by dividing the value of wages by the number of employees. 
We find the correlation between the average wage and the energy intensity is very low (for example, 
the correlation is 0.02 across reporting units in 2006). This suggests that, at least for the average 
price of labour inputs, the input price channel may not affect our results. 
While energy intensity from the ARD survey is calculated at the reporting unit level, in the first 
stage of our analysis we use a time-invariant measure of energy intensity at the firm level (see 
section 2.1 above). To calculate this measure we first average the energy intensity of each ARD 
reporting unit over the period 2005 to 2008. We check the robustness of our results to averaging 
over 2002 to 2005, although averaging over the earlier period leads to a loss of sample size (when 
estimating the 2006 to 2015 long interval). We average the energy intensity variable over time to 
mitigate the effect of annual fluctuations in energy intensity that may take place each year, whether 
specific to an individual reporting unit or driven by an industry-specific shock.12  
Using the average energy intensity of each reporting unit, we then consider two approaches to 
calculating firm level energy intensity. First, we take the energy intensity of the firm’s most energy 
intensive reporting unit (maximum energy intensity). This approach is appropriate if a firm’s 
decision to invest in the US is driven by its most energy intensive line of production. Second, we 
take the overall energy intensity of the firm (by calculating the weighted average energy intensity 
across all the firm’s reporting units in the manufacturing sector). This measure is appropriate if 
investment decisions made by a firm are driven by the average energy intensity of its manufacturing 
activities. From the reporting unit level data, we also identify the modal 2-digit sector in which the 
firm has UK operations for the construction of the firm-level sector-time trends. 
For the second stage of our analysis on the plant exit decision in the UK, using the reporting unit 
data from the ARD sample is problematic. First, reporting units in the ARD sample often provide 
energy expenditure data on behalf of multiple plants (local units), in order to reduce the compliance 
                                                     
12 When calculating the reporting unit’s average energy intensity we exclude outliers (when energy intensity is 
measured as greater than 0.8).  
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costs of the survey. Therefore, exit of an individual plant may not be captured at the reporting unit 
level for multi-plant reporting units. The ARD sample is also structured such that the probability 
of being sampled decreases the smaller the reporting unit, and so will to some extent under-
represent smaller reporting units that are most likely to exit. Second, the energy intensity data are 
only observed for reporting units that survive.  
To address these concerns, we analyse exit at the plant level using data on the full population of 
UK plants, known as local units (rather than the ARD reporting unit sample). Plants are economic 
units rather than accounting units. Other studies in the literature on plant exit in the UK also take 
the approach of using the local unit population from the ARD (e.g. Simpson, 2012; Martin et al. 
2014). This allows us to capture exit of plants (local units) within reporting units. The ARD local 
unit data contains information on the population of UK plants through to 2015. From these data 
we can calculate the plant survival spell through to 2014, where a plant survival spell ends in year 
t if t is the final year in which the plant is observed in the population. Thus our sample period for 
the survival analysis is 2002-2014. We then measure energy intensity at the 5-digit industry level. 
This allows us to work with the full population of local units, since we observe a 5-digit industry 
code for all plants. To calculate the energy intensity of 5-digit industries, we aggregate the reporting 
unit level data on energy intensity to the industry level, using appropriate sampling weights. We fix 
the industry energy intensity equal to its value at the beginning of the sample period, in order to 
mitigate the potentially endogenous adjustment in the energy intensity of UK industries over time.  
From the plant population data, we can also construct control variables for plant size 
(employment), labour productivity, and firm structure, which the existing literature suggests may 
also affect the propensity to exit (Simpson, 2012; Bernard and Jensen, 2007).13 For firm structure 
we construct two indicators for multi-plant firms: a dummy for whether a plant is owned by a firm 
with other plants in the same 5-digit manufacturing industry (𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖_𝑖𝑛𝑑); and a dummy for 
whether a plant is owned by a firm with plants in other 5-digit manufacturing industries 
(𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖_𝑚𝑎𝑛).  
3.3 Energy prices 
For the estimation of the second stage regression equation (3), we need an annual measure of the 
endowment-driven energy price gap between the US and UK. We consider two approaches. First, 
we use the UK-US natural gas price gap. Arezki et al. (2017) argue that the natural gas price gap 
between the US and OECD EU countries can econometrically serve as a measure of the 
                                                     
13 To calculate labour productivity we use output from the corresponding reporting unit population dataset. Thus all 
plants owned by the same reporting unit will have the same labour productivity in a given year. 
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exogenous US energy endowment shock. By a similar argument, Figure 1 suggests that the natural 
gas price gap between the UK and US can serve as a measure of the US energy endowment shock 
– and absence of a US-style energy endowment shock in the UK. Second, we use the overall energy 
price measure recently developed by Sato et al. (2018). They compile a measure of overall energy 
prices using a weighted average of the energy prices P for four energy fuel types q (oil, gas, coal 
and electricity). The energy price index is defined as follows: 
𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑡 = ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑞
𝑞
× log (𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑞) 
where: 
𝑊𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑞 = ∑
𝐹𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑞
∑ 𝐹𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑞
𝑞𝑞
 
where 𝐹𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑞
 is the consumption of fuel type q in sector k in country i, and in time period t and 𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑞
 
is the real fuel price. As adjustments in energy consumption may respond endogenously to the 
energy price, we use the index with the weights fixed over time based on data from 2005. From 
this index we then derive the overall energy price gap between the UK and US by sector. The 
advantage of the Sato et al. (2018) index is that it allows us to take into account the price gaps for 
all fuels, not just natural gas prices. It also allows us to model the heterogeneous effect of the 
energy price gap across sectors due to sector differences in the composition of energy 
consumption. 
Descriptive statistics for the overall energy price gap are provided for a selection of sectors in 
Figure A1 in the Appendix. Figure A2 in the Appendix shows that the overall energy price gap for 
manufacturing is highly correlated with the natural gas price gap. They are closely related because 
natural gas is the biggest source of energy consumption for UK manufacturing and possibilities 
for interfuel substitution mean that lower relative natural gas prices will lead to lower relative prices 
for energy substitutes. In addition, the natural gas price gap has a direct effect on relative electricity 
prices because a major source of electricity generation in both the UK and US is gas-fired 
generation.  
3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 below gives summary statistics for the energy intensity of reporting units observed at the 
beginning of the long interval i.e., averaged over 2005-2008. The most energy intensive 2-digit 
sectors are highlighted in bold in panel B. They include other non-metallic mineral products, 
recycling, basic metals, and pulp and paper. However, there is a substantial degree of variation in 
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the energy intensity of reporting units within sectors, which supports the value of a highly 
disaggregated analysis.   
Table 1: Summary statistics for reporting unit energy intensity 
Panel A. All manufacturing     
Definition Mean SD SD, between 2-digit SD, within 2-digit Observations 
Energy Exp/Output 0.021 0.027 0.011 0.026 18,175 
 
     
Energy Exp / Variable Costs 0.024 0.025 0.012 0.024 18,175 
 
     
 
Panel B. Energy expenditure / Variable Costs by 2-digit industry 
SIC Description Mean SD P10 P90 Observations 
15 & 16 Food products, beverages and tobacco 
products 
0.030 0.023 0.010 0.057 1,680 
17 Textiles 0.029 0.024 0.008 0.056 678 
18 Wearing Apparel 0.015 0.032 0.002 0.027 391 
19 Leather and leather products 0.013 0.011 0.003 0.025 104 
20 Wood and wood products 0.023 0.019 0.007 0.043 628 
21 Pulp and paper 0.032 0.033 0.011 0.078 497 
22 Publishing and printing 0.016 0.012 0.003 0.032 1,717 
23 Coke and refined petroleum products 0.030 0.040 0.000 0.085 59 
24 Chemicals and chemical products 0.031 0.037 0.007 0.064 901 
25 Rubber and plastic products 0.029 0.016 0.013 0.047 1,207 
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.058 0.056 0.014 0.128 668 
27 Basic metals 0.035 0.025 0.009 0.064 486 
28 Fabricated metal products 0.026 0.023 0.009 0.047 2,649 
29 Machinery and equipment nec 0.019 0.016 0.006 0.034 1,964 
30 Electrical and optical equipment 0.011 0.012 0.001 0.021 127 
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus nec 0.014 0.012 0.005 0.025 880 
32 Radio, television and communication 
equipment 
0.017 0.017 0.004 0.036 373 
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments 0.012 0.011 0.004 0.022 738 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.018 0.023 0.006 0.029 581 
35 Other transport equipment 0.019 0.022 0.004 0.033 409 
36 Manufacturing nec 0.020 0.019 0.006 0.035 1,301 
37 Recycling 0.046 0.033 0.009 0.089 137 
Notes: Table gives summary statistics for the energy intensity of reporting units observed over the beginning-of-sample period 
(i.e., average energy intensity over 2005-2008). SD indicates standard deviation. P10 and P90 indicate the 10% and 90% percentile 
respectively. In panel B the bold rows indicate the five most energy intensive industries. 
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Table 2 gives the correlations between the alternative definitions of energy intensity and the 
different methods for aggregating from the reporting unit level to the firm level (described above 
in section 3.2). The maximum and overall energy intensity of firms are very highly correlated, 
which reflects that many firms in our sample have only a single reporting unit. However, if we 
consider only US investors, the correlation between the maximum and overall energy intensity is 
lower, as shown in panel B. This is because US investors are more likely to have multiple reporting 
units than purely domestic firms.  
Table 2: Correlation between alternative definitions of firm-level energy intensity  
 
Max Energy 
Exp/Output 
Max Energy 
Exp/Costs 
Overall Energy 
Exp/Output 
Overall Energy 
Exp/Costs 
Panel A: All firms 
    
Max Energy Exp/Output 1.000 
   
Max Energy Exp/Costs 0.776 1.000 
  
Overall Energy Exp/Output 0.970 0.756 1.000 
 
Overall Energy Exp/Costs 0.755 0.976 0.773 1.000 
Panel B: US investors only 
    
Max Energy Exp/Output 1.000 
   
Max Energy Exp/Costs 0.858 1.000 
  
Overall Energy Exp/Output 0.794 0.764 1.000 
 
Overall Energy Exp/Costs 0.782 0.894 0.889 1.000 
Notes: Max measures the energy intensity of the firm’s most energy intensive reporting unit. Overall measures the overall energy 
intensity of the firm. All variables measured in levels. Correlations calculated for all firms in the dataset in 2006. All correlations are 
significant at the 1% level.  
 
Finally, in Table 3 we report on the characteristics of plants owned by US investors and the control 
group of plants owned by non-US multinationals. We find that there are a substantial number of 
plants that exit over our sample period of 2002-2014, with about 2,000 plants shut down by firms 
in each group (US and non-US investors) and the annual exit rates of plants are around 9%. We 
also note that plants owned by firms investing in the US are larger on average in terms of 
employment but are slightly less productive than non-US investors. 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of plant dataset by FDI status, 2002-2014 
 US investors Non US investors 
Observations 25,499 22,602 
Exit events 2,189 2,067 
Exit  0.086 0.091 
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 (0.280) (0.289) 
Age (years) 9.072 9.287 
 (5.989) (6.246) 
Employment 129.251 89.057 
 (353.159) (204.875) 
Labour productivity 207.708 220.324 
 (1292.312) (3304.002) 
Multi_ind 0.725 0.720 
 (0.447) (0.449) 
Multi_man 0.800 0.733 
 (0.400) (0.443) 
Industry energy intensity 0.021 0.023 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
Notes: Calculations are averages over plants present in the population over 2002-2014. Table shows means with 
standard deviations in parentheses. Exit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the plant exits in period t +1. Age is 
truncated at 42 years. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Decision to invest in US 
In this section we report the results for the estimation of equation (1a), which considers the 
decision by UK firms to open or acquire affiliates in the US over the long interval 2006 to 2015. 
First differencing ensures identification of the effect of the US endowment-driven energy price 
gap on the investment decisions of UK firms is based only on within-firm variation in FDI 
behaviour. By not using cross-sectional variation this is a demanding estimator that is robust to 
unobserved firm heterogeneity. Of the 6,061 firms in the sample, 126 firms have US affiliates in 
2006 and 180 firms have US affiliates in 2015. In total, 68 new firms switch into US investment, 
and 14 firms switch out of US FDI. The fact that only a small proportion of the overall sample 
invest in the US is consistent with findings elsewhere in the heterogeneous firms literature – 
namely, that only the most productive firms are able to overcome the sunk costs involved with 
doing FDI. 
The results are reported in Table 4. Estimated coefficients are shown with standard errors in 
parentheses. These regressions use alternative measures of energy intensity (as a ratio to output or 
costs) and with and without 2-digit industry controls. Columns (1) to (4) use the energy intensity 
of the firm’s most energy intensive reporting unit. These are our baseline results. Columns (5) to 
(8) use the firm’s overall energy intensity.14  
                                                     
14 We measure energy intensity in logarithmic form. The results are qualitatively similar if we measure energy 
intensity in levels. 
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In column (1) energy intensity is defined as the share of energy expenditure in gross output 
(turnover). In this case we find a positive effect of the energy intensity variable that is significant 
at the 1% level. This result suggests that UK firms with energy intensive reporting units are more 
likely to invest in the US after the endowment-driven energy price gap (relative to the same energy 
intensive firms before the price gap). This supports the hypothesis that energy intensive UK firms 
are engaging in FDI in order to take advantage of lower energy costs in the US. In column (2) we 
define energy intensity as the share of energy expenditure in variable costs. The estimated 
coefficient is again positive and significant at the 1% level. Columns (3) and (4) estimate the same 
specifications as in columns (1) and (2) but now including sector dummy variables to control for 
time-varying sector effects that influence outward FDI. The results are robust to the inclusion of 
these controls. We continue to find that UK firms with the most energy intensive reporting units 
are more likely to invest in the US in the post fracking period. 
Table 4: First differences regressions for decision to invest in the US over 2006 to 2015 long 
interval 
 (1) 
∆USFDI 
(2) 
∆USFDI 
(3) 
∆USFDI 
(4) 
∆USFDI 
(5) 
∆USFDI 
(6) 
∆USFDI 
(7) 
∆USFDI 
(8) 
∆USFDI 
         
         
 ln(Energy Exp/Output)_k 0.005***  0.006***  0.002  0.004**  
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
 ln(Energy Exp/Costs)_k  0.006***  0.008***  0.002  0.003* 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
         
Observations 6061 6061 6061 6061 6061 6061 6061 6061 
R2  0.002 0.002 0.012 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.010 
Mean USFDI in 2015 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 
Energy Intensity Max Max Max Max Overall Overall Overall Overall 
2-digit sector dummies NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Notes: First difference regressions for decision to invest in the US. Table shows coefficients with heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors in parentheses. Columns (1) to (4) measure energy intensity as the firm’s most energy intensive line of business, while columns 
(5) to (8) use the firm’s overall energy intensity. * indicates p < 0.10, ** indicates p < 0.05, and *** indicates p < 0.01.  
 
We now assess the magnitude of the estimated coefficients. The standard deviation of log energy 
expenditure as a share of variable costs in our sample is 0.791. Therefore, the coefficient in column 
(4) of Table 4 implies that a 1 standard deviation increase in (log) energy intensity increases the 
probability of investing in the US in the post energy price shock period (relative to before the 
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shock) of 0.791 × 0.008 = 0.006. That is, 0.6 of a percentage point.15 A small adjustment in absolute 
terms is in line with our expectations because only the very best firms are sufficiently productive 
to overcome the sunk costs associated with establishing new affiliates abroad. The overall rate of 
investment in the US in the post-shock period in our sample is equal to just 2.97%. Therefore 0.6 
of a percentage point represents about 20% of US FDI in the post shock period. 
In Table 4 columns (5) to (8) we now measure energy intensity across all the firm’s UK 
manufacturing operations. For these specifications we find more mixed evidence compared to the 
regressions using the firm’s most energy intensive reporting unit. The coefficients are statistically 
significant only with the inclusion of the sector dummies to control for sector trends in columns 
(7) and (8). The estimated effect is significant only at the 10% level in column (8). The fact that we 
observe a strongly significant effect when using the maximum energy intensity, but not the energy 
intensity across all reporting units, suggests that concerns over energy consumption and costs in 
particular parts of the firm’s production process drive the increased propensity to invest in the US. 
Averaging over all of the firm’s operations tends to hide this relationship. These results imply that 
it is important to take into account within-firm heterogeneity in the energy intensity of production 
when analysing firm-level FDI decisions.16 
We unpick the significant effects observed in columns (3) and (4) in Table 4 by testing whether 
there is an asymmetric effect of energy intensity on the decision to locate new production in the 
US (entry) compared to the decision to close or sell off US affiliates (exit). Table 5 reports the 
results of this exercise. The entry and exit specifications can be estimated using the probit 
estimator, allowing us to check that the results are robust to properly modelling the curvature of 
the regression function in the proximity of 0 and 1.  
 
Table 5: Estimation of firm decision to enter US investment and exit from US investment 
 
 
(1) 
ENTRY 
OLS 
(2) 
ENTRY 
OLS 
(3) 
ENTRY 
PROBIT 
(4) 
ENTRY 
PROBIT 
(5) 
EXIT 
OLS 
(6) 
EXIT 
OLS 
(7) 
EXIT 
PROBIT 
(8) 
EXIT 
PROBIT 
         
                                                     
15 We obtain the same magnitude from the results in column (3) of Table 4. 
16 A possible concern is that the results in Table 4 are driven by a few firms with very high energy intensities (even 
though we have dropped the reporting units with energy intensities greater than 0.8). However, we check the energy 
intensities of the 68 firms opening new plants in the US and find that none of these firms have an energy intensity 
greater than 0.15 (measured either as a share of output or costs). The results are also fully robust to dropping all 
firms with very high energy intensities (greater than, say, 0.3) from the sample. Therefore, we conclude our results 
are not driven by outliers. 
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ln(Energy Exp/Output)_k 0.006***  0.007***  -0.062**  -0.056*  
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.028)  (0.032)  
ln(Energy Exp/Costs)_k  0.007***  0.008***  -0.063**  -0.062* 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.031)  (0.036) 
         
Observations 5,936 5,936 5,936 5,936 125 125 125 125 
R2 0.018 0.018 - - 0.242 0.238 - - 
Pseudo R2 - - 0.080 0.078 - - 0.090 0.087 
Mean ENTRY / EXIT 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.112 
Energy Intensity Max Max Max Max Max Max Max Max 
2-digit sector dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Levels regressions for the decision to enter or exit from US investment by 2015. Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) 
estimate OLS regressions, where coefficients are reported with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) estimate probit regressions, where marginal effects are reported with standard errors in 
parentheses. * indicates p < 0.10, ** indicates p < 0.05, and *** indicates p < 0.01. 
 
Columns (1) to (4) in Table 5 consider the entry decision. For these regressions we drop from the 
sample those firms that already owned affiliates in the US in 2006, such that we use only firms that 
undertake FDI into the US for the first time during the sample window. The dependent variable 
is now in levels rather than first differences, and is defined as a dummy equal to 1 if the firm starts 
investing in the US by 2015, and 0 if it remains a non-US investor. Hence, identification can only 
come from the decision to enter US FDI. Columns (1) and (2) report OLS regressions, while 
columns (3) and (4) report probit regressions. As expected, the signs on the energy intensity 
measures are always positive, and always significant at the 1% level. The magnitudes of the 
coefficients are comparable to those found in Table 4. Reassuringly, the probit gives very similar 
results to the OLS regressions.  
Columns (5) to (8) in Table 5 consider the closure of US affiliates and retain only firms that 
operated in the US at the start of the sample period (in 2006). Here we define the dependent 
variable as equal to 1 for firms that closed their US affiliates by 2015 (and a 0 for firms that remain 
as US-investors). We now always find a negative and significant coefficient, indicating UK owned 
firms with energy intensive production processes are less likely to exit from investing in the US. 
The coefficients are notably larger in magnitude than for the entry regressions, suggesting there 
are asymmetries between the two margins of adjustment. However, this finding should be treated 
with some caution given the standard errors have also increased substantially, which reflects the 
very small sample size (and that only 14 firms in the sample withdraw from US investment).  
We now consider potential threats to the validity of our modelling strategy. We begin by focusing 
on possible unobserved determinants of FDI. As the shock to energy endowments was a US-
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specific event, an obvious falsification test for the above findings is to consider whether UK firms 
are also expanding their plants into non-US locations. If energy intensive firms are investing in the 
US to take advantage of the US energy endowment driven price gap, then we should find no 
increased propensity for energy intensive firms to locate production in non-US countries. To test 
whether this is the case, in Table 6 we repeat the same specifications as in Table 4 but now for the 
EU FDI decision. There are 145 firms in the sample investing in the EU in 2006 and 216 firms 
investing in the EU in 2015. 90 new firms switch into EU FDI and 19 firms switching out of EU 
FDI. Reassuringly, we find no evidence of a statistically significant and positive effect of the firm’s 
maximum energy intensity on the EU investment decision. This supports the interpretation of our 
results as the causal effect of the US energy endowment-driven price gap.17 
Table 6: Falsification test first differences regressions for decision to invest in the EU over 2006 
to 2015 long interval 
 (1) 
∆EUFDI 
(2) 
∆EUFDI 
(3) 
∆EUFDI 
(4) 
∆EUFDI 
(5) 
∆EUFDI 
(6) 
∆EUFDI 
(7) 
∆EUFDI 
(8) 
∆EUFDI 
         
         
 ln(Energy Exp/Output)_k -0.000  -0.000  -0.002  -0.002  
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
 ln(Energy Exp/Costs)_k  -0.002  -0.002  -0.004**  -0.005** 
  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
         
Observations 6061 6061 6061 6061 6061 6061 6061 6061 
R2  0.000 0.000 0.009 0.009 0.000 0.001 0.009 0.009 
Mean EUFDI in 2015 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 
Energy Intensity Max Max Max Max Overall Overall Overall Overall 
2-digit sector dummies NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Notes: First difference regressions for decision to invest in the EU. Table shows coefficients with heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors in parentheses. Columns (1) to (4) measure energy intensity as the firm’s most energy intensive line of business, while columns 
(5) to (8) use the firm’s overall energy intensity. * indicates p < 0.10, ** indicates p < 0.05, and *** indicates p < 0.01.  
 
Underlying the interpretation of the positive and significant effects found in columns (1) to (4) of 
Table 4 as the causal effect of the US endowment-driven energy price gap is the common trends 
assumption. That is, in the absence of the US energy endowment shock, the propensity to locate 
production in the US should be the same over time for energy intensive firms relative to non-
energy intensive firms. The fact that we do not find significant results for the EU FDI decision 
                                                     
17 Table A1 in the Appendix shows falsification test results for the entry and exit regressions using the EU FDI 
decision. 
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supports the validity of this assumption. As a further test, we re-estimate our baseline specifications 
but using data from the period 1998-2006, which is the period before the rapid growth of US shale 
gas production.18 If there is not a common trend during the pre-sample period, it suggests that our 
results may simply reflect a pre-existing trend unrelated to the UK-US energy price gap that 
emerged in the mid-2000s.  
Table A2 in the Appendix reports these results. As expected, the coefficients on the energy 
intensity variables are now always small in magnitude and insignificant for the US investment 
decision. Therefore, there is no evidence of a pre-existing trend towards more FDI in the US by 
firms with relatively energy intensive operations. This is also the case for the EU investment 
decision in the pre-sample period. 
We next consider whether the results are robust to constructing our measure of energy intensity 
in a different way. For the results in Table 4 we average the reporting unit energy intensity over 
2005-2008 (see section 3.2). We consider the robustness of the results to averaging over an earlier 
period of 2002-2005. The results are given in the Table A3 in the Appendix. Averaging over an 
earlier period changes the sample of firms included in the analysis and leads to some loss of 
variation in the dependent variable. For the US FDI decision there are now 56 firms switching 
into FDI and 14 firms switching out, while for the EU FDI falsification test there are 75 firms 
switching into FDI and 19 firms switching out. Nonetheless, the main results are robust. There 
remains a positive and significant effect of the likelihood of US-bound FDI if the firm operates 
an energy intensive manufacturing unit in the UK in the period before the fracking boom in the 
US.19  
An additional concern is that our results may capture some other time-varying effect driving US 
FDI, that we have wrongly attributed to the firm’s energy intensity. For example, it is well known 
that energy intensive firms are usually capital intensive, and it may be there is an increased 
propensity for capital intensive firms to invest in the US over time. If this is a non-linear trend 
then it may not be detected in our pre-sample falsification test. We address this concern by 
controlling for other factor intensities of production interacted with the post-fracking dummy in 
the model (equation (1)). Allowing for time-varying effects of additional factor intensities is highly 
                                                     
18 We use an 8 year interval for the pre-sample period because before 1998 the AFDI register used a different 
coding method. We continue to measure energy intensity over the period 2005-2008 to ensure we are comparing 
firms with the same recorded energy intensity as that considered in Table 4. We obtain very similar results for these 
regressions if instead we measure energy intensity over the earliest possible four year period for which energy 
intensity data are available (1999-2002). These results are available on request.   
19 The overall energy intensity of the firm is now insignificant for all specifications. 
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demanding for our data, given that only a small number of firms undertake FDI. The results are 
given in Table A4 in the Appendix. Columns (1) and (2) repeat the baseline results from Table 4 
with the inclusion of sector trends. Columns (3) and (4) add a further interaction term with the 
firm’s most capital intensive line of production and columns (5) and (6) control for an interaction 
term with the firm’s most labour intensive line of production.20 Finally, columns (7) and (8) include 
all factor intensities together. Across all specifications, we continue to find the effect of the firm’s 
energy intensity is highly significant on the likelihood of US-bound FDI. The capital intensity 
interaction is only weakly significant (at the 10% level) while the labour intensity interaction is 
always insignificant.   
We next consider whether the choice of comparison years for the long interval, 2006 and 2015, 
are representative of FDI positions before and after the US energy endowment shock. To address 
this issue we turn to our second empirical exercise for modelling US and EU FDI, given by 
equation (2) above. Here we focus on the baseline results using the firm’s most energy intensive 
reporting unit and using energy intensity defined as energy expenditures as a share variable costs. 
Full results for all measures of energy intensity for both the US and EU FDI decisions are given 
in Table A5 in the Appendix.21  
Results are presented in Figure 3 below, which plots the coefficients estimated for each year 
relative to the omitted year (2006). The vertical lines indicate the 95% confidence interval around 
the coefficients for the US FDI regression. For US investment, we find the coefficients for 2002-
2005 are not statistically different to 2006. There is no evidence to suggest that the propensity for 
energy intensive firms to conduct FDI into the US was increasing over these four years. This again 
demonstrates that our results for the 2006-2015 long interval do not simply reflect a positive pre-
existing trend – if anything, there is a slight downward trend over this short pre-sample period. 
This evidence is consistent with the assumption that the energy price gap is unanticipated.  
Figure 3 also shows that the coefficient on energy intensity for 2007 is larger than the coefficient 
for 2006 (although it remains insignificantly different at the 5% level). However, the increase in 
2007 is transitory rather than a persistent adjustment, because in 2008-2012 the coefficients on 
energy intensity are again very close to 0. Only in 2014 and 2015 is there a clear positive effect of 
                                                     
20 Capital intensity is defined as the total capital stock per unit of output or costs Capital stocks are calculated using a 
perpetual inventory method (PIM) based on investment data from the ARD production survey. Labour intensity is 
defined as wages per unit of output or costs. 
21 We use a sample that consists of all firms, including those that exit during the sample period. We obtain similar 
results if we drop firms that fail, such that only the firms that survive through to 2015 are included in the sample.  
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energy intensity on the propensity to invest in the US. In contrast, there is no discernible increase 
in the propensity for energy intensive firms to invest in the EU, with the coefficients always close 
to zero. The fact that there is a clear positive effect for US FDI only towards the end of our sample 
is not surprising given there are substantial fixed costs associated with establishing new foreign 
plants, and so FDI decisions are likely to respond with a lag to the price gap. Moreover, firms may 
initially perceive any price gaps as temporary, and so view the short-term gains from locating 
production in the US to be not worth the costs of relocating. Only when price gaps persist may 
firms consider undertaking FDI.  
Figure 3: Plot of coefficients giving effect of firm energy intensity on the propensity to invest in 
the US and EU by year 
 
Notes: Results from non-parametric regression of the US and EU investment decision on interaction terms between 
firm energy intensity and a vector of year dummies, using annual data and controlling for firm fixed effects and 
sector-time effects. Coefficients for both US and EU investment are effects relative to the omitted year (2006), with 
vertical lines indicating the 95% confidence intervals for the coefficients from the US FDI regression. 
4.2 Decision to close plants in UK 
We now consider whether those firms undertaking FDI into the US are in turn shutting down 
their energy intensive plants in the UK in response to the energy price gap. Table 7 presents results 
from the estimation of the discrete time hazard model and the linear probability model, where we 
define the energy price gap as the natural gas price gap (using price data shown in Figure 1 above). 
In all specifications, the natural gas price gap does not enter directly into the regression, as it varies 
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over time only and so is absorbed by year fixed effects. Likewise, the energy intensity of the 
industry does not enter directly as it is absorbed by industry fixed effects. For the hazard model 
we report estimated coefficients, rather than hazard ratios (exponentiated coefficients), to facilitate 
comparison with the linear probability model.  
In column (1) of Table 7 we estimate the cloglog with 5-digit industry fixed effects. In column (2) 
we estimate the same specification using OLS and in column (3) we include firm fixed effects. 
Columns (4) to (6) then explore the robustness of the firm fixed effects model from column (3). 
In column (4) we add in 2-digit sector-year fixed effects to control for sector trends. In column 
(5) we estimate a highly demanding specification that includes 5-digit industry-year fixed effects to 
control for all observed and unobserved time-varying industry variables, such as demand shocks 
and the degree of import competition facing plants in the industry. Finally, in column (6) we also 
estimate the model with 5-digit industry-year fixed effects but we now include foreign owned 
multinational firms in the sample (as well as UK owned multinational firms).  
Columns (1) and (2) give similar results in terms of the signs and significance of the effect of the 
explanatory variables. In both cases we find the coefficient on the US FDI variable is negative and 
significant. This result indicates that there is a lower hazard rate for plants owned by UK firms 
engaging in US FDI for an industry with average energy intensity (and in the absence of a UK-US 
natural gas price gap).22 However, when we include firm fixed effects in columns (3) to (6) we find 
the US FDI variable becomes insignificant. We also find that the interaction term between 𝑈𝑆𝐹𝐷𝐼 
and ln(𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦) is negative and significant across all specifications. This result suggests 
that in the absence of an energy price gap between the US and UK, firms with FDI in the US are 
less likely to shut down more energy intensive production (relative to non-US investors). That is, 
investing in the US is a complement for energy intensive UK production rather than a substitute, 
at least in terms of the likelihood of plant closure. 
Table 7: Plant exit in UK in response to natural gas price gap between the US and UK over 
2002-2014 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Cloglog OLS Firm FEs  Firm FEs Firm FEs Firm FEs 
       
ln(Employment)_pt -0.313*** -0.027*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.036*** 
 (0.020) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
ln(Productivity)_pt -0.161*** -0.015*** -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.021*** 
 (0.027) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Multi_Ind_pt 0.335*** 0.026*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.041*** 
 (0.060) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
                                                     
22 This follows from the fact that we scale the industry energy intensity variable by its average, such that the log 
energy intensity is 0 for the average industry.  
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Multi_Man_kt 0.282*** 0.022*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.051) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
PriceGap_t*ln(Energyintensity)_j 0.077 0.005 -0.017** -0.021**   
 (0.100) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)   
USFDI_kt -0.132** -0.011** -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.009 
 (0.054) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
USFDI_kt*ln(Energyintensity)_j -0.298*** -0.030*** -0.026*** -0.032*** -0.039*** -0.040*** 
 (0.068) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) 
USFDI_kt*PriceGap_t 0.064 0.007 0.011 0.009 0.014 0.014* 
 (0.090) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
USFDI_kt*PriceGap_t*ln(Energyintensity)_j 0.008 0.007 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 
 (0.114) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) 
       
Observations 48101 48101 48101 48101 47818 56903 
R2 - 0.050 0.146 0.154 0.201 0.184 
Number of 5 digit industries 240 240 240 240 240 263 
Region fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
5 digit industry effects YES YES YES YES NO NO 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES NO NO  NO 
Firm fixed effects NO NO YES YES YES YES 
2 digit sector-year effects NO NO NO YES NO NO 
5 digit industry-year effects NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Foreign owned firms in sample NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Notes: Table shows estimated coefficients with standard errors clustered at 5 digit industry level in parentheses. The specifications 
have a binary dependent variable that is equal to 1 in year t if t is the final year the plant is observed. All regressions control for a 
fully non-parametric baseline hazard function (plant survival spell effects). * indicates p < 0.10, ** indicates p < 0.05, and *** indicates 
p < 0.01. 
We now turn to the interaction terms of interest, namely the interactions with the natural gas price 
gap. The interaction term between 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐺𝑎𝑝 and ln(𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦) indicates the effect of the 
UK-US energy price gap on the exit of energy intensive plants for the control group of firms that 
do not invest in the US. We know, by definition, that these firms have not offshored production 
to the US. However, they may be outsourcing energy intensive production to US-based firms that 
they do not own. Equally, there may also be an increase in competition for all firms owing to an 
increase in energy intensive imports from the US. If these channels are important, we would expect 
firms with no US FDI to be more likely to shut down their energy intensive UK production in 
response to the UK-US energy price gap. However, as shown in Table 7, we find that the 
interaction between 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐺𝑎𝑝 and ln(𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦) for the control group of firms is 
insignificant in columns (1) and (2). In addition, it is significant and negative at the 5% level in 
columns (3) and (4). The US energy endowment shock does not therefore appear to have increased 
the rate of closure for energy intensive plants owned by firms with no US FDI, and if anything 
there is a decreased risk of closure for such plants. Therefore, the outsourcing and import 
competition effects are not found to be economically important for these firms.  
Turning next to those UK owned firms with US operations, we find the interaction between the 
US FDI variable and the natural gas price gap (𝑈𝑆𝐹𝐷𝐼* 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐺𝑎𝑝) is insignificant in columns (1) 
to (5) and only significant at the 10% level in column (6). Hence, there is little evidence to suggest 
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that UK owned firms investing into the US are more likely to shut down UK plants with average 
energy intensity in response to the US fracking shock. However, the triple interaction term 
between USFDI, the energy price gap and the energy intensity of the industry (𝑈𝑆𝐹𝐷𝐼 * 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐺𝑎𝑝 
* ln(𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦)) is always strongly significant and positive when we include firm fixed 
effects (columns (3) to (6)). This result suggests that firms investing in the US have responded to 
the US energy endowment shock by increasing their propensity to shut down energy intensive 
plants in the UK, relative to the control group of non-US investors, when we control for 
unobserved firm heterogeneity. Therefore, there does appear to be some evidence to support the 
concern that firms investing in the US find the UK a less attractive location for energy intensive 
production due to the energy price gap.  
In terms of the plant-level control variables, it is reassuring that the results are as we expect. We 
find that bigger plants which are more productive have lower hazard rates. There is also evidence 
that firms are more likely to shut down plants if they own multiple plants in the same 5-digit 
industry, and if it they have operations in multiple 5-digit industries. In addition, the baseline 
hazard function (not reported) indicates that the hazard rate falls the longer the plant’s survival 
spell. These results are consistent with those found elsewhere in the plant survival literature (e.g. 
Simpson, 2012). 
To assess the magnitude of the coefficients estimated in Table 7, we compute the marginal effect 
of investing in the US on the propensity to exit UK plants at alternative values for industry energy 
intensity and the energy price gap. We consider the case of a high energy intensive industry, for 
which we use the manufacture of industrial gases (SIC 2411) in the chemicals sector. This industry 
is one of the most energy intensive industries in our sample with an energy cost share of 11.1%. 
We have 160 plant-year observations in our data for this industry. We also consider the case of the 
average industry which has an energy cost share of 2.4%. For the price gap, we consider the peak 
price gap observed in 2013 of 1.7 pence per kWh and a natural gas price gap of 0.  
The marginal effects of US FDI on plant exit at these representative values are given in Table 8. 
We find that US FDI leads to a 5.0 percentage point increase in the propensity to exit plants in the 
high energy intensive industry and in the peak energy gap year (relative to the control group of 
firms doing outward FDI but not in the US). In the absence of the price gap, we find US investors 
are less likely to exit energy intensive plants by a similar magnitude. Thus, the emergence of the 
UK-US energy price gap is associated with an 9.6 percentage point change in the marginal effect 
of US FDI for high energy intensive plants. This is a substantial adjustment given the overall 
probability of exit is about 9%.    
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Table 8: Marginal effects of US FDI on plant exit in UK at representative values 
 Peak natural gas price gap No natural gas price gap 
   
High energy intensity 0.050 -0.046 
   
Average energy intensity 0.011 -0.007 
   
Notes: Table shows estimated marginal effects of US investment based on coefficients estimated in column (3) in 
Table 7. High energy intensity reflects the energy cost share of the manufacture of industrial gases (SIC 2411) equal 
to 11.1%. The average energy intensity is 2.4%. The peak price gap 1.7 pence per kWh, observed in 2013.  
We can further evaluate the magnitude of the marginal effect of US FDI using a back of the 
envelope calculation. A one standard deviation increase in energy intensity in the peak natural gas 
price year of 2013 increases the plant exit propensity in response to US FDI (relative to non-US 
investors) by 0.015. Using the total number of plants owned by US investors in 2013 (1,640 plants), 
this implies the additional exit of 24 plants, or 19.5% of the total number of plants that US 
investors exit in 2013 (124 plants). The average employment in plants that US investors shut down 
in 2013 is 63 employees, and so the exit of 24 plants suggests the loss of about 1,500 jobs. 
We can perform a second back of the envelope calculation to evaluate the magnitude of the effect 
of the energy price gap on average across all plants. We calculate the average marginal effect of US 
FDI on plant exit for each year in our sample in which the US has lower energy prices (2006-2014). 
We calculate these average marginal effects using the observed values for the energy intensity of 
each plant and the observed natural gas price gap in each year. We then calculate the difference in 
each year’s average marginal effect of US FDI and the average marginal effect if there were no 
price gap. This calculation gives a predicted increase in the propensity for US investors to exit UK 
plants in each year due to the price gap on average across all plants. Using the number of plants 
owned by US investors in each year, and the average employment in plants that are shut down by 
US investors in each year, we can then arrive at an overall estimate of plant exit and the resulting 
jobs losses. We find that the energy price gap leads US investors shut down 27 more manufacturing 
plants than non-US investors over 2006-2014, resulting in the loss of 1,600 UK jobs. 27 plants is 
2.5% of the total number of plants that are shut down by US investors over 2006-2014. Therefore, 
the magnitude of the effect of the energy price gap on average across all plants is relatively small.  
Rather than focusing only on the natural gas price gap, an alternative approach involves modelling 
the energy price gap between the US and UK as the overall energy price gap provided by Sato et 
al. (2018). As explained above, the overall price gap is a weighted average energy price of four fuels 
(oil, gas, coal and electricity) where the weights are based on fixed (time invariant) sector-specific 
energy consumption. Table A6 in the Appendix reports results using this measure. As the energy 
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price gap now varies across 2-digit sectors as well as over time, it is not absorbed by the year fixed 
effects and so enters directly into the model when we do not include sector-time effects (columns 
(1) to (3)). The findings are very similar to those in Table 7. We continue to find that in the absence 
of an energy price gap, firms with US affiliates are less likely to shut down energy intensive UK 
plants. Moreover, the propensity for firms that undertake US FDI to shut down energy intensive 
UK plants increases significantly in the energy price gap when we include firm fixed effects 
(columns (3) to (6)).   
4.3 Effect of US investment on energy intensity 
Finally, as an extension to our analysis we investigate the effect of US FDI on the energy intensity 
of surviving UK manufacturing units after the emergence of the energy price gap. Analysing this 
intensive margin of adjustment allows us to consider if multinational firms aim to exploit the US 
energy price advantage by restructuring their production such that they reduce the energy intensity 
of their UK production mix. We estimate fixed effects regressions that use only within-reporting 
unit variation in energy intensity over time for identification, for the sample period 2002-2015. As 
with the exit decision, we compare US investors to a control group of firms conducting non-US 
outward FDI. The results are reported in Table A7 in the Appendix. We find the interaction 
between US FDI and the energy price gap does not have a significant effect on reporting unit 
energy intensity. Therefore, there is no evidence to suggest that the comparative disadvantage of 
the UK in energy intensive production vis-à-vis the US leads firms that operate in both countries 
to switch their surviving UK manufacturing units to less energy intensive production.    
5. Conclusion 
The US shale gas revolution has led to a sharp fall in US natural gas prices, while energy prices 
have risen elsewhere in Europe and Asia. This is because natural gas cannot be easily transported 
long distances, and so shocks to energy abundance can give rise to large variations in regional 
energy prices around the world. Concerns have grown about the competitiveness impacts of these 
international differences in energy prices for Europe vis-à-vis the US, especially because the gap is 
not temporary: it has persisted for several years since it first emerged in the mid-2000s and is 
expected to continue for years into the future. As developed countries share similar characteristics 
in terms of other factors of production, such as physical and human capital abundance, the energy 
endowment and price gap with the US may be an important source of comparative disadvantage 
for Europe.  
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In this paper, we investigate the impact of the persistent energy price gap between the US and 
Europe on the foreign direct investment decisions of firms. We use micro-data from the UK to 
investigate the incentives for individual firms that are heterogeneous in their energy intensity to 
operate production in the US and the EU. We also consider the decision to shut down energy 
intensive plants in the UK in response to the UK-US energy price gap. Our results provide 
evidence that the US FDI decisions by energy intensive UK firms have responded to the 
endowment-driven energy price gap. We find that this result is driven by the firm’s most energy 
intensive line of production rather than its average energy intensity. Furthermore, there is evidence 
to suggest that the price gap is associated with an increased propensity for energy intensive plants 
owned by US investors to exit in the UK, relative to a control group of non-US investors. These 
results support the concern that US investors are relocating their energy intensive production from 
the UK.  
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Appendix 
Figure A1: Overall UK-US energy price gap for selection of manufacturing sectors 
 
Notes: Figure shows the UK-US energy price gap in the fixed weight energy price index from Sato et al. (2018) 
using time-invariant weights from 2005. 
Figure A2: UK-US natural gas price gap and overall energy price gap for manufacturing 
 
Notes: The natural gas price gap is calculated using data on industrial sector natural gas prices from the IEA. The 
overall energy price gap is calculated using weighted average energy price data for four fuels (oil, natural gas, coal 
and electricity) for the manufacturing sector from Sato et al. (2018).  
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Table A1: Estimation of firm decision to enter into EU investment and exit from EU investment 
 
 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
PROBIT 
(4) 
PROBIT 
     
     
Panel A: Entry into EU     
     
ln(Energy Exp/Output)_k 0.003  0.003  
 (0.002)  (0.002)  
ln(Energy Exp/Costs)_k  0.002  0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
     
R2 0.014 0.014 - - 
Pseudo R2 - - 0.0452 0.0436 
Observations 5,936 5,936 5,936 5,936 
     
     
Panel B: Exit from EU     
     
ln(Energy Exp/Output)_k 0.006  0.030  
 (0.041)  (0.031)  
ln(Energy Exp/Costs)_k  0.014  0.035 
  (0.045)  (0.034) 
     
R2 0.105 0.105 - - 
Pseudo R2 - - 0.0248 0.0262 
Observations 144 144 144 144 
     
For all specifications:     
Energy Intensity Max Max Max Max 
2-digit sector dummies YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Levels regressions for the decision to enter into or exit from EU investment by 2015. Columns (1) and (2) estimate 
OLS regressions, where coefficients are reported with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns 
(3) and (4) estimate probit regressions, where marginal effects are reported with standard errors in parentheses. * indicates 
p < 0.10, ** indicates p < 0.05, and *** indicates p < 0.01. 
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Table A2: First difference regressions for pre-sample US and EU investment over 1998 to 2006 
long interval  
 (1) 
∆USFDI 
(2) 
∆USFDI 
(3) 
∆USFDI 
(4) 
∆USFDI 
(5) 
∆EUFDI 
(6) 
∆EUFDI 
(7) 
∆EUFDI 
(8) 
∆EUFDI 
         
Panel A: Maximum Energy Intensity        
         
 ln(Energy Exp/Output)_k -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  
 ln(Energy Exp/Costs)_k  -0.002  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
         
R2  0.000 0.000 0.009 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 
         
         
Panel B: Overall Energy Intensity        
         
 ln(Energy Exp/Output)_k -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
 ln(Energy Exp/Costs)_k  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
         
  R2 0.000 0.001 0.009 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 
         
For all specifications:         
Observations 7192 7192 7192 7192 7192 7192 7192 7192 
2-digit sector dummies NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Notes: First difference regressions for decision to invest in the US or EU for sampled firms. Table shows coefficients with 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1) to (4) consider the US investment decision while columns (5) to 
(8) consider the EU investment decision. * indicates p < 0.10, ** indicates p < 0.05, and *** indicates p < 0.01.  
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Table A3: Decision to invest in the US and EU over 2006 to 2015 long interval using energy 
intensity averaged over 2002-2005 
 (1) 
∆USFDI 
(2) 
∆USFDI 
(3) 
∆USFDI 
(4) 
∆USFDI 
(5) 
∆EUFDI 
(6) 
∆EUFDI 
(7) 
∆EUFDI 
(8) 
∆EUFDI 
         
Panel A: Maximum Energy Intensity        
         
 ln(Energy Exp/Output)_k 0.005***  0.006***  0.003  0.003  
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
 ln(Energy Exp/Costs)_k  0.004*  0.006***  0.002  0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
         
R2  0.001 0.001 0.010 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.008 
         
         
Panel B: Overall Energy Intensity        
         
 ln(Energy Exp/Output)_k 0.002  0.003  0.001  0.001  
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
 ln(Energy Exp/Costs)_k  0.000  0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
         
  R2 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.008 
         
For all specifications:         
Observations 5,887 5,887 5,887 5,887 5,887 5,887 5,887 5,887 
2-digit sector dummies NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Notes: First difference regressions for decision to invest in the US or EU for sampled firms using energy intensity averaged over 2002-
2005. Table shows coefficients with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1) to (4) consider the US 
investment decision while columns (5) to (8) consider the EU investment decision. * indicates p < 0.10, ** indicates p < 0.05, and *** 
indicates p < 0.01.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
Table A4: First differences regressions for decision to invest in the US over 2006 to 2015 long 
interval controlling for time-varying effects of other factor intensities 
 (1) 
∆USFDI 
(2) 
∆USFDI 
(3) 
∆USFDI 
(4) 
∆USFDI 
(5) 
∆USFDI 
(6) 
∆USFDI 
(7) 
∆USFDI 
(8) 
∆USFDI 
         
 ln(Energy Exp/Output)_k 0.007***  0.006***  0.007***  0.006***  
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
ln(Capital Stock/Output)_k   0.003*    0.003*  
   (0.002)    (0.001)  
ln(Wages/Output)_k     0.000  0.000  
     (0.002)  (0.002)  
 ln(Energy Exp/Costs)_k  0.008***  0.008***  0.009***  0.008*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
ln(Capital Stock/Costs)_k    0.003*    0.003* 
    (0.002)    (0.002) 
ln(Wages/Costs)_k      0.001  0.001 
      (0.002)  (0.002) 
         
Observations 5771 5771 5771 5771 5771 5771 5771 5771 
R2  0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012 
2-digit sector dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: First difference regressions for decision to invest in the US FDI for sampled firms. Table shows coefficients with 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1) and (2) repeat baseline results from Table 4. Columns (3) and (4) 
introduce capital intensity interaction term. Columns (5) and (6) introduce labour intensity interaction term. Columns (7) and (8) 
include all three interaction terms. * indicates p < 0.10, ** indicates p < 0.05, and *** indicates p < 0.01.  
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Table A5: Effect of firm energy intensity on the propensity to invest in the US and EU by year  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 US FDI US FDI EU FDI EU FDI 
ln(Energy Exp/Costs)_k*2002_t 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ln(Energy Exp/Costs)_k*2003_t 0.002 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ln(Energy Exp/Costs)_k*2004_t 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ln(Energy Exp/Costs)_k*2005_t 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ln(Energy Exp/Costs)_k*2006_t - - - - 
     
ln(Energy Exp/Costs)_k*2007_t 0.001* 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ln(Energy Exp/Costs)_k*2008_t 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ln(Energy Exp/Costs)_k*2009_t -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ln(Energy Exp/Costs)_k*2010_t -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
ln(Energy Exp/Costs)_k*2011_t -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
ln(Energy Exp/Costs)_k*2012_t 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ln(Energy Exp/Costs)_k*2013_t 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ln(Energy Exp/Costs)_k*2014_t 0.005*** 0.003 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ln(Energy Exp/Costs)_k*2015_t 0.006*** 0.003 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
Observations 137829 137829 137829 137829 
R2 0.801 0.801 0.749 0.749 
Energy Intensity Max Overall Max Overall 
Firm FEs YES YES YES YES 
2-digit sector-year dummies YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Fixed effects regressions for decision to invest in the US or EU for sampled firms using annual data over 2002-2015. Table 
shows coefficients with standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. Columns (1) to (2) consider the US investment 
decision while columns (3) to (4) consider the EU investment decision. * indicates p < 0.10, ** indicates p < 0.05, and *** indicates p < 
0.01. 
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Table A6: Plant exit in UK in response to overall energy price gap between the US and UK over 
2002-2014 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Cloglog OLS Firm FEs  Firm FEs Firm FEs Firm FEs 
       
ln(Employment)_pt -0.312*** -0.027*** -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.036*** 
 (0.020) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
ln(Productivity)_pt -0.157*** -0.015*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.021*** 
 (0.027) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Multi_Ind_pt 0.333*** 0.026*** 0.036*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 
 (0.059) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Multi_Man_kt 0.281*** 0.022*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.051) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
PriceGap_st -1.562** -0.028* -0.007 0.511**   
 (0.661) (0.015) (0.015) (0.250)   
PriceGap_st*ln(Energyintensity)_j 0.229 0.020 -0.032 -0.039*   
 (0.274) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022)   
USFDI_kt -0.115 -0.014* -0.018** -0.008 -0.010 -0.011 
 (0.083) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
USFDI_kt*ln(Energyintensity)_j -0.264** -0.032*** -0.040*** -0.044*** -0.053*** -0.052*** 
 (0.121) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) 
USFDI_kt*PriceGap_st 0.092 0.013 0.017 0.008 0.018 0.019 
 (0.222) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.014) 
USFDI_kt*PriceGap_st*ln(Energyintensity)_j -0.008 0.013 0.065** 0.067*** 0.087*** 0.081*** 
 (0.318) (0.026) (0.026) (0.023) (0.025) (0.019) 
       
Observations 48101 48101 48101 48101 47818 56903 
R2 - 0.049 0.144 0.154 0.201 0.184 
Number of 5 digit industries 240 240 240 240 240 263 
Region fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
5 digit industry effects YES YES YES YES NO NO 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES NO NO  NO 
Firm fixed effects NO NO YES YES YES YES 
2 digit sector-year effects NO NO NO YES NO NO 
5 digit industry-year effects NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Foreign owned firms in sample NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Notes: Table shows estimated coefficients with standard errors clustered at 5 digit industry level in parentheses. The specifications 
have a binary dependent variable that is equal to 1 in year t if t is the final year the plant is observed. All regressions control for a 
fully non-parametric baseline hazard function (plant survival spell effects). * indicates p < 0.10, ** indicates p < 0.05, and *** indicates 
p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table A7: Energy intensity in UK in response to energy price gap between the US and UK over 2002-2015 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
ln(Employment)_rt -0.093** -0.103** -0.050 -0.056 -0.092** -0.103** -0.050 -0.056 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) 
ln(Productivity)_rt -0.333*** -0.356*** -0.150*** -0.165*** -0.332*** -0.355*** -0.149*** -0.165*** 
 (0.053) (0.054) (0.041) (0.043) (0.053) (0.054) (0.041) (0.043) 
Multi_Ind_rt 0.005 0.012 0.016 0.024 0.004 0.012 0.014 0.024 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Multi_Man_kt -0.070** -0.073** -0.069** -0.071** -0.071** -0.073** -0.070** -0.071** 
 (0.034) (0.029) (0.034) (0.030) (0.034) (0.029) (0.035) (0.030) 
USFDI_kt -0.015 -0.005 -0.003 0.006 -0.019 -0.013 -0.004 0.002 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030) 
USFDI_kt*PriceGap_t 0.040 0.053 0.023 0.035     
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.031) (0.033)     
PriceGap_st     0.174  0.229  
     (0.288)  (0.283)  
USFDI_kt*PriceGap_st     0.058 0.086 0.024 0.052 
     (0.063) (0.066) (0.061) (0.062) 
Observations 9332 9332 9332 9332 9332 9332 9332 9332 
R2 0.066 0.144 0.054 0.143 0.066 0.144 0.054 0.143 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Reporting unit fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
2 digit sector-year effects NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Notes: Table shows coefficients from within-reporting unit regressions with standard errors clustered at the reporting unit level in parentheses. Dependent variable is logged energy 
intensity of reporting unit r in time period t. Energy intensity is defined as a share of output in columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) and as a share of costs in columns (3), (4), (7) and (8). 
Columns (1) to (4) use the natural gas price gap, and columns (5) to (8) use the overall energy price gap. * indicates p < 0.10, ** indicates p < 0.05, and *** indicates p < 0.01.  
 
 
 
